Differential market entry determinants for for-profit and non-profit at-home care providers in large Japanese cities by Nakazawa, Katsuyoshi
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Differential market entry determinants
for for-profit and non-profit at-home care
providers in large Japanese cities
Katsuyoshi Nakazawa
Toyo University
11 May 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70215/
MPRA Paper No. 70215, posted 12 May 2016 10:23 UTC
1 
 
Differential market entry determinants for for-profit and non-profit 
at-home care providers in large Japanese cities∗ 
 
Katsuyoshi Nakazawa† 
Abstract 
Japan’s long-term care insurance system requires that for-profit and non-profit at-home care 
service providers provide the same services at the same prices. Both types of providers compete 
on completely equal terms, though they may have different determinants of entry. This study 
considers market entry determinants for both for-profit and non-profit at-home long-term care 
providers in large Japanese cities. The estimation results show that potential for-profit entrants 
were sensitive to issues of profit, and that potential non-profits enter disadvantaged 
municipalities. The net entry rates of both potential entrants have gradually declined. The results 
show that both providers’ entries compensate for the gap between at-home long-term care 
demand and supply in each religion. Non-profit entrants supplement for-profit entrants because 
non-profits enter regions with low profitability. However, the insurance systems will face an 
issue due to the increase in premiums and decrease in unit prices, which discourage new entries. 
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1. Introduction 
The Japanese long-term care (LTC) insurance system requires that for-profit and non-profit 
at-home care service providers offer the same services at the same unit-prices. Both types of 
providers compete on completely equal terms, though they may have different determinants of 
entry.  
For-profit providers aim to maximize profits, while non-profit providers may have different 
goals, such as increasing common welfare (e.g., Anthony and Young, 2003; Hansmann, 1980; 
Salamon and Anheier, 1994). Non-profit providers do occasionally have profit-oriented aims, 
such as business expansion or borrowing from a bank (e.g., Chang and Tuckman, 1990; 
Eldenburg et al., 2011). If both types of providers have the same determinants for entry, then 
both will enter only profitable areas.  
A potential entrant decides whether to enter based on expected profit and market structure.1 
This paper investigates the difference in market entry determinants between for-profit and 
non-profit at-home LTC providers in large Japanese cities.  
 
2. Variables and data  
I calculate rate of entry based on the number of providers in each municipality by year. Thus, 
I could use the net data of for-profit/non-profit providers. 
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1 Geroski and Schwalbach (1991) discuss the relationship between entry and market structure. 
Siegfried and Evans (1994) survey the empirical studies on the determinants of entry/exit. Pehrsson 
(2009) presents a detailed discussion on the barriers to entry. 
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Ent is the net entry rate. The right denominator N  of expression (1) represents the number 
of existing providers. The subscripts i, t, and p represent municipality, year, and provider type 
(for-profit/non-profit), respectively.  
Potential (for-profit) entrants would prefer profitable municipalities. It is important for 
potential entrant to determine how much it will cost to acquire a potential user in the new 
municipality because providers must charge the prices established for LTC services under the 
LTC insurance scheme. In addition, it is better for the provider if potential clients use the LTC 
services often.  
Potential user acquisition is a strong incentive for market entry. The first variable is the ratio 
of eligible insured individuals to total employees of professional caregivers of at-home LTC 
services (EII_care), which indicates the degree of accessibility to potential users2. The second 
variable is the at-home LTC benefit per user (benefit), which is the average number of LTC uses 
in a municipality. I adopt the current facility care services per elderly resident (faci) because the 
amount of facility care services might substitute for at-home care service.  
Potential entrants should compete with existing providers on non-price characteristics (e.g., 
service quality). The ratio of full-time caregivers to total employees (r_full) represents the cost 
of supply of each municipality. Moreover, the provider also needs to know the cost to employ 
caregivers because LTC services have the feature of a labor-intensive business. Providers should 
pay a comparatively higher salary to employ full-time caregivers, who are difficult to replace. A 
high ratio of full-time caregivers is a cost-pushing factor for potential entrants. However, this 
                                                  
2 When an elderly resident needs long-term care, the municipality’s Certification Committee for 
Long-term Care Need assesses eligibility by evaluating the person’s physical and mental conditions 
that require care. The conditions requiring care range from mild to severe in a multistep approach. 
The degree of eligibility ranges across seven levels from “support care required I” (lowest level) to 
“long-term care required V” (highest level). The Committee allocates benefits based on points and 
limits care according to the degree of eligibility. 
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indicator is not a barrier to entry for non-profit entrants that intend to invest in the quality. 
Potential for-profit entrant should be more sensitive to these variables than potential 
non-profit entrants. The empirical analysis is limited to large-scale municipalities with 200,000 
or more residents because they have at-home LTC data (e.g., number of employee) publicly 
available. Municipal-level benefit data are available from 2003. This study uses unbalanced 
panel data for 60 municipalities from 2003 to 2012 (525 observations). However, some 
municipalities were amalgamated in this period. To control for the influence of amalgamation, I 
adopt a dummy variable for amalgamated municipalities from the year of amalgamation 
(d_amalg). Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
3. Estimation results 
This study uses a fixed effect estimation and balanced panel data as a robustness check. 
Table 2 presents the estimation results. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
The results of the F and Hausman tests indicate the presence of fixed effects. The estimation 
results for for-profit entrants seem to support the hypothesis that potential for-profit entrants 
strongly consider the (regional) market structure of profitability. On the other hand, potential 
non-profit entrants did not react to EII_care, as do the for-profit entrants. Moreover, non-profit 
entrants did not react to benefit and Full. The results support the hypothesis that potential 
non-profit entrants did not consider the market structure of profitability.  
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The year dummies were strongly negative for all estimation results. The LTC insurance 
unit-prices and benefits change every three years, called the program management period. These 
were reduced from the 3rd program management period (2006-2008), which led to a fall in new 
entries.  
The results of the balanced panel data matched those from the unbalanced data. The 
estimation results were robust.  
Finally, I ran seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to estimate a system of equations 
involving contemporaneous correlations between the errors of different equations for the same 
period. After estimating SUR, I checked the hypothesis of independence of both equations using 
the Breusch-Pagan (BP) test. The BP test results, of 0.732 and 1.646 for unbalanced and 
balanced data, respectively, did not reject the independency of both estimation equations for 
all estimation results.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The reform of the Japanese LTC care system in 2000 allowed for-profit providers to offer 
LTC services, though must charge the same price for its services as non-profit providers in the 
same region. This study examines the differential determinants of entry both for-profit and 
non-profit entrants using unbalanced or balanced panel data for large Japanese cities. The results 
show that both types of entrants tend to enter regions where there are few professional 
caregivers compared to the number of eligible elderly residents who need LTC. In addition, 
potential for-profit entrants were more sensitive to profitability factors than non-profit entrants, 
who did not avoid entering low profitability regions. Finally, the year dummies were strongly 
negative for both for-profit and non-profit entrants. 
These results indicate that for-profit and non-profit entrants compensate for the gap between 
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at-home LTC demand and supply in each region. Moreover, non-profit entrants supplement 
for-profit entrants because non-profit entrants do enter regions with low profitability. However, 
the year dummies indicate that the net entry rate did decline, implying that municipalities should 
improve unit-prices to encourage new entrants of both business types. Despite this result, raising 
the prices may be untenable for regional LTC insurance systems because the premiums has 
increased over the period. 
Though the results in this study are robust, it is limited to large cities due to data limitations. 
For-profit and non-profit entrants may make different decisions for other types of municipalities, 
which will become an issue in the future.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and data sources 
Variables Unit Mean S.D. Min Max 
Ent (for-profit) % 11.667 21.516 -21.428 115.151
Ent (non-profit) % 6.328 17.646 -14.342 95.833
EII_care 1 Person 26.786 8.089 14.384 57.768
Benefit 1,000 JPY 45.935 11.104 20.879 102.389
Faci,  1,000 elderly 12.585 2.248 6.394 19.272
r_full % 49.002 6.900 26.340 73.320
d_amalg dummy 0.057 0.232 0 1
Sources: National survey of long-term care facilities and offices (2002–2012), Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare. Annual reports of long-term care insurance (2002–2013), Ministry 
of Health, Labour and Welfare. 
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Table 2. Estimation results 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, 
respectively. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors.  
  Unbalanced Balanced 
For-profit Non-profit For-profit Non-profit 
EII_care 0.856*** (0.181) 0.464*   (0.241) 0.729*** (0.197) 0.469*    (0.267)
Benefit 0.427*** (0.149) -0.108   (0.091) 0.469*** (0.114) -0.110    (0.106)
Faci -1.421*** (0.534) -1.746*** (0.745) -1.282*   (0.739) -2.046**   (0.969)
r_full -0.256**   (0.126) 0.101   (0.102) -0.256*   (0.149) 0.168     (0.167)
d_amalg 0.835    (1.912) 2.575*   (1.575) 1.446    (1.713) 2.665     (1.810)
constant 55.650*** (13.194) 70.049*** (8.489) 55.272*** (15.776) 71.056*** (10.262)
Year dummy 
2004 -54.905*** (3.991) -55.789*** (3.516) -56.019*** (4.464) -55.978*** (3.765)
2005 -48.449*** (3.830) -50.431*** (3.836) -48.988*** (3.585) -49.726*** (4.062)
2006 -61.137*** (3.886) -56.106*** (3.734) -61.736*** (4.295) -56.031*** (4.091)
2007 -62.869*** (3.784) -57.066*** (3.740) -64.470*** (3.890) -57.368*** (4.084)
2008 -63.516*** (3.801) -60.225*** (3.865) -62.617*** (3.944) -59.999*** (4.242)
2009 -63.695*** (3.672) -60.752*** (3.363) -63.401*** (3.663) -60.780*** (3.656)
2010 -61.857*** (4.613) -64.920*** (3.923) -61.302*** (3.636) -65.793*** (4.235)
2011 -74.951*** (4.208) -61.747*** (2.760) -73.935*** (4.275) -62.370*** (2.837)
2012 -53.321*** (3.643) -59.889*** (3.031) -53.253*** (3.370) -60.298*** (3.203)
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F test 1.32* 1.34* 1.38* 1.53** 
Hausman test 46.66*** 54.74*** 30.80*** 56.52*** 
R-sq. 0.794 0.852 0.820 0.861
Sample 525 525 400 400
Group 60 60 40 40
